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  Journée d’Etude « Ellipse et anaphore », Institut Charles V, Université Paris 7 (15 octobre 2011)  
  
Indexical reference within a discourse context: Anaphora, 
deixis,  “anadeixis” and ellipsis1  
 
Francis Cornish 
Université Toulouse-Le Mirail 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Two principles underlie my recent work on discourse anaphora and deixis: 
 
First, that it is not very revealing to study either deixis or (discourse) anaphora without 
taking account of the whole range of indexical referring procedures available in natural 
languages. After all, deixis and anaphora are an integral part of a whole network of indexical 
procedures. So in my view they should be conceived one in terms of the other, in a reciprocal 
manner. See Figures 2 and 3, as well as sub-sections 2.1 and 2.2 below.   
And second, that indexical expressions (i.e. context-bound means of “pointing”) only 
manifest their true nature in the context of whole texts, whether spoken or written. Indeed 
they are closely bound up with the structuring of the discourse that may be associated with a 
particular text within a given context (see sect. 5 further on).  
 
I will be synthesising my recent work in this area under 5 main headings:  
 
- works that attempt to approach anaphora, “anadeixis” and deixis as discourse phenomena —
to define them, in short — and then to see how and in what respect the different types of 
indexical expressions at issue may realise each procedure (sect. 2).  
- next, a (brief) consideration of what I have called “topic chains” (also known as “reference” 
or “anaphoric” chains) and the functions performed within such chains by different types of 
expressions (i.e. the various “links” in the chains) (sect. 3). 
- then two headings characterising certain discourse functions which certain indexical 
referring procedures may fulfil, as part of the construction of discourse itself:  
 
• First, within what we might call “micro-discourse”, the contribution of indexicals to the 
setting up of local coherence or rhetorical relations in order to integrate two discourse units 
into a more encompassing unit; and in turn, the contribution of given coherence relations to 
the complete, in-context interpretation of the indexicals involved (sect. 4);  
 
• And then within a “macro-discourse” context, the functions fulfilled in particular by certain 
demonstrative expressions realising a discourse-deictic procedure in terms of the structuring 
of discourse (sect. 5).  
 
- to end, I will deal with ellipsis (VP- but mainly object-ellipsis, which is actually rather rare 
in English, unlike in colloquial spoken French) (sect. 6). 
Finally, as a “Postscript”, I will list several recurring difficulties that I have noticed 
amongst students at Toulouse-Le Mirail at L3 level in analysing anaphoric as well as deictic 
expressions within written texts (sect. 7). These errors and confusions are quite significant, 
since they show up “negatively”, as it were, some of the essential features of indexical 
                                                
1 Thanks are due to Christian Bassac for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper, as well as for the discussion by the 
audience at the oral presentation. 
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reference in discourse. They are intended to make you aware of the pitfalls in this area. 
So,…beware!  There are two lists of References at the end of the paper: the first lists relevant 
works by myself as author, arranged according to topic; and the second is a General 
Reference list citing the authors mentioned in the text.  
 
2. Anaphora, deixis and “anadeixis”: nature and description 
 
I’ll start off by taking a “cognitive-functional” view of deixis, anadeixis and discourse 
anaphora —defining their discourse behaviour and functioning within texts. But first, we need 
to establish some preliminary concepts and distinctions.  
Ever since my doctoral thesis defended in 1982, I have rejected the “co-textual” 
conception of anaphora, inherited from traditional grammar and Classical Antiquity. This 
conception is very much alive and kicking in current linguistics, whether in computational 
linguistics, in formal semantics, in pragmatics or in theoretical models of language, whether 
formalist or even functionalist in orientation (see my survey article of 2010 in the journal 
Functions of Language 17.2 on this issue). This holds that, in order to assign a complete sense 
and reference to an anaphoric expression (whether a null pro-form, an overt 3rd person 
pronoun, a definite, possessive or demonstrative lexical NP, etc.), it must necessarily be 
brought into relation with a matching textual antecedent expression that co-occurs with it in a 
given text. It is quite frequent in such approaches to read that “an anaphor refers (my 
emphasis) to its antecedent”, which is a totally inaccurate statement.  
This matching relationship entails among other properties the sharing of feature values 
for the morpho-syntactic features of number, gender and person for free, bound and reflexive 
pronouns, as well as the absence of a c-command relation obtaining between anaphor and 
antecedent expression. Other factors are heuristic rather than structural: for example, the 
syntactic function parallelism obtaining between antecedent and anaphor (e.g. subject-subject, 
object-object, etc.).  
What characterises this type of approach is a hypostacised, reified conception of the 
text as sole or main domain in which anaphora is said to operate. Now, since my 1999 book 
published by OUP, I have argued for a three-way distinction amongst the inter-dependent 
dimensions of text, context and discourse. These three phenomena are inter-defining and 
interactive in the use of language in context. From my perspective, this distinction is crucial 
for a proper understanding of the way indexicality operates. Table 1 summarises.  
 
Table 1:  The respective roles of text, context and discourse (Cornish 2010, Table, p. 209, revised) 
Text Context Discourse 
The connected sequence of 
verbal signs and nonverbal 
signals in terms of which 
discourse is co-constructed by 
the discourse partners in the act 
of communication. 
 
The context (the domain of reference 
of a given text, the co-text the 
discourse already constructed 
upstream, the genre of speech event in 
progress, the socio-cultural 
environment assumed by the text, the 
interactive relationships holding 
between the interlocutors at every 
point in the discourse, and the specific 
utterance situation at hand) is subject 
to a continuous process of 
construction and revision as the 
discourse unfolds. It is by invoking an 
appropriate context that the addressee 
or reader may create discourse on the 
basis of the connected sequence of 
textual cues that is text. 
The product of the hierarchical, 
situated sequence of utterance, 
indexical, propositional and 
illocutionary acts carried out in 
pursuit of some communicative 
goal, and integrated in a given 
context.  
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What I am calling text embraces the entire perceptible trace of an act of utterance. As 
such it includes paralinguistic features of the utterance act, as well as non-verbal semiotically 
relevant signals such as gaze direction, pointing and other gestures, etc. (and in the written 
form of language, paragraph divisions, punctuation, underlining etc.) —i.e. not just the purely 
verbal elements. Text in this conception is essentially linear, unlike discourse, which is the 
product of the hierachically-structured, situated sequence of utterance, indexical, 
propositional and illocutionary acts carried out in pursuit of some communicative goal.  
‘Discourse’ is the ever-evolving, revisable interpretation of a particular communicative event, 
which is jointly constructed mentally by the discourse participants as the text and a relevant 
context are perceived and evoked (respectively). 
Context I conceive in cognitive terms in relation to the mental representations which 
speaker and addressee are jointly developing as the communication proceeds, and as such it is 
continuously evolving. The context in terms of which the addressee or reader creates 
discourse on the basis of text comprises the following aspects: the domain of reference of a 
given text (including of course the local or general world knowledge that goes with it), the 
surrounding co-text of a referring expression, the discourse already constructed upstream of 
its occurrence, the genre of speech event in progress, the socio-cultural environment assumed 
by the text, the interactive relationships holding between the interlocutors at every point in the 
discourse, and the specific utterance situation at hand. It is subject to a continuous process of 
construction and revision as the discourse unfolds.  
Now, to what use(s) is context put in the act of utterance —in other words, what is or 
are its raison(s) d’être? Well, the most important of these is to ground (Fr. ancrer) the 
discourse being co-constructed —first and foremost in the context of utterance, but also in 
terms of a genre (type of speech event) and a topic domain. Relevant context is what enables 
discourse to be created on the basis of text: it is through the invocation of a relevant context 
that addressees may draw inferences (Conversational implicatures in Gricean terms: cf. the 
work of the American philosopher H. Paul Grice in the 1970s and 1980s2) on the basis of the 
speaker’s uttering what he or she utters. This very important feature of the use of language 
allows speakers (if they so wish) to be as economical as possible in their use of the coded 
language system in creating text, as a function of their current communicative goals (cf. Clark 
1996: 250-251). They can rely on their addressees to a great extent to ‘fill in’ the many gaps 
that may be left in the textual realization of their intended message. 
Example (1) provides an opportunity to see the relevance of each of these dimensions: 
 
(1) “When I think of all the grey memorials erected in London to equestrian generals, 
the heroes of old colonial wars, and to frock-coated politicians who are even more 
deeply forgotten, I can find no reason to mock the modest stone that 
commemorates Jones on the far side of the international road which he failed to 
cross in a country far from home, though I am not to this day absolutely sure of 
where, geographically speaking, Jones’s home lay.” (Graham Greene, 1999, The 
Comedians, Vintage Books, p. 9) 
 
Example (1) is an extract taken from the very beginning of a 20th Century novel.  
Straight away, we can see that the possessive NP Jones’s home in l. 6 refers in part to the 
discourse representation evoked via the reference to the character ‘Jones’ (who can be 
assumed to be dead, since there has been a question of a ‘modest stone’ commemorating him 
                                                
2 See Chapman (2005), chapter 5 “Logic and Conversation” (pp. 85-113) for the relevant details. 
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mentioned in the co-text upstream of this reference). And his death is presumably linked to 
the fact that he “failed to cross” an international road in a country far from his home (again, 
an inference), a point mentioned in line 4. But the construction of the discourse object that is 
‘Jones’s home’ will not have been done on the basis of a unitary expression within the co-text 
(a “textual antecedent”, then), since these two references occur in distinct (subordinate) 
clauses within the preceding co-text. And yet the interpretation of the anaphoric possessive 
NP is easily achieved, with no difficulty at all.  
 
(2)  “… Another guest, a tall princess, married to an erudite naturalist landowner  
called Béla Lipthay, from Lovrin in the Banat, was a descendant (not direct, I 
hope) of Pope Innocent IX of the famous house of Odescalchi, lords of 
Bracciano.* 
* According to Sir Walter Scott (or Macaulay quoting him; I’ve searched both in vain and will 
probably come upon the passage the day after this book is out), Bracciano, by its reedy lake, was 
the best example of a mediaeval fortress he had ever seen… ”” (Patrick Leigh Fermor, 
Between the Woods and the Water, London: John Murray 2004, p. 104) (Example 
(17) in Cornish, 2010, p. 231) 
 
In this written autobiographical narrative extract, the “antecedent triggers”3 are both 
the framing adverbial PP According to Sir Walter Scott (or Macaulay quoting him…) and the 
conjunct I’ve searched both in vain in the first line of the footnote containing the definite NP 
anaphor the passage (second line of the footnote). But there is no “canonical” textual 
antecedent at all here. The indexical NP is licensed via the preceding discourse, where it has 
been a question of searching various works for confirmation of something the author 
remembered from his prior reading.  
Many other such examples, involving a variety of different types of anaphor, can be 
found in my 1999 book as well as in the other publications listed in the various sections of the 
References at the end of the paper. 
Now let’s examine a recipe, from a ‘directive’ genre of language use, to illustrate 
another point about “textual antecedents”. The clauses are numbered for convenience. 
  
(3) Lobster with warm potato, shallot and tarragon salad.(1) Slice 200g new potatoes 
into thinnish discs.(2) Simmer ø until al dente.(3) Split a cooked lobster 
lengthways,(4) and make a dressing with 1 tbs red wine vinegar, 2.5 tbs extra-virgin 
olive oil, 2 diced shallots, tarragon, salt and pepper.(5) Drain the potatoes,(6) and 
dress ø.(7) Serve ø  with the lobster  and lemon wedge.(8) (Recipe 24, The Observer 
Food Monthly  supplement, August 2007, item 77, p. 34) 
 
Each clause of this text corresponds to a particular procedure, a stage in the 
preparation of the dish under consideration. What is of course crucial to an understanding of 
this text is the particular predication in each clause denoting the culinary operations to be 
applied to the initially raw ingredients. The genre imposes that each predication denote an 
operation to be applied in sequence to the result of the immediately preceding one; indeed, 
there is a single type of coherence relation adopted to integrate the discourse associated with 
each clause: “Sequence”.  
The key point about texts of this kind is that the mental representation of the original, 
raw ingredients at the start changes as a result of each culinary operation that is applied.  So 
when the reduced definite NP the potatoes is encountered in line 4 (clause 6), it will be 
                                                
3 In my terminology: see below on this aspect. 
 5 
interpreted as referring to ‘the firm, simmered (Fr. mijotés), thinly-sliced pieces of the 
original 200g. of potatoes’.4  But if we linked this NP directly to its ostensible textual 
antecedent —the indefinite NP 200g new potatoes in clause 2 (line 1) at the very beginning of 
the text—, then what would be being ‘drained’ and ‘dressed’ on the basis of the processing of 
clauses 6 and 7 (line 4) would be the raw, unsliced, unsimmered (i.e. not yet boiled in water), 
unscrubbed and unwashed set of potatoes that we started out with. For this is the referent 
evoked by this textual antecedent. Yet it is precisely this that the co-textual account of 
discourse anaphora entails. The dinner guests are not likely to be very impressed with the dish 
that results from this interpretation, now are they?!   
The problem posed for the “textualist” description of anaphora by instances of 
“evolving reference” as illustrated in (3) stems precisely from the fact that the ‘discourse’ 
dimension is left out of account.  
All the textual antecedent (“antecedent-trigger” in my terminology) does in such 
instances is determine the ontological category of entity which the anaphor’s referent 
presupposes. In (3), these are, respectively, ‘potato’ and ‘lobster’, in (2), ‘stretch of text in a 
book’, and in (1), ‘home’: these are cases of the ontological category “Instance” in Fraurud’s 
(1996) typology of referents. But the referent itself may differ in a number of ways. 
See Brown & Yule (1983) for very similar criticisms of the co-textual account of 
anaphora, notably in relation to Halliday & Hasan’s (1976) conception of anaphora 
(“reference”) in terms of their concept of cohesion.  
 
Here is a selection of the conclusions which I arrived at at the end of my survey article 
in Functions of Language 17.2 (2010) regarding the discourse functioning of anaphora and its 
characterisation: 
 
• The antecedent’s referent does not remain static once it is established: its representation in the discourse 
accrues and/or sheds properties as a function of what is predicated of it downstream of its initial 
occurrence (see the phenomenon known as  “evolving reference”). Hence, the sense and reference of 
the anaphor ostensibly in relation with it may well be rather different (see example (3) in particular). 
 
• Depending on the ‘textual antecedent’ as well as anaphor involved, the anaphor may well contribute to 
the understanding of the antecedent properties which the latter did not initially have for the recipient 
(see example (14) in section 4 below). 
 
• Furthermore, there may well be no canonical textual antecedent at all (see examples (2) and (5) as well 
as (16) in Cornish, 2010); and yet the anaphor (in all three cases a definite NP or a 3rd person pronoun) 
may be interpreted without difficulty via the drawing of relevant inferences. 
 
• The specific indexical properties of the different types of anaphors (3rd person pronouns, definite NPs, 
both expanded and reduced, demonstrative-based expressions, and so on), taken in conjunction with the 
anaphoric predication as a whole, play an important role in determining the anaphor’s in-context 
interpretation (see (2), (5) and (16) in Cornish, 2010 in particular). It is not the anaphor qua separate 
expression that picks up the relevant salient discourse representation at the point of utterance, but the 
entire anaphoric predication — which triggers the integration of the discourse unit to which it 
corresponds with its immediate discourse context in terms of an appropriate coherence relation (see the 
analysis of (14) further on). This is the ‘discourse’ contribution to the functioning of anaphors in texts. 
 
                                                
4 Note that I distinguish linguistic forms, meanings and referents via the following notation system: italics (or underlining) 
for antecedent triggers and anaphors, deictics and anadeictics (all functioning at the level of text), “double inverted 
commas” for meaning representations (the “antecedents” or full semantic-pragmatic interpretations of indexicals, operating 
at the level of discourse), and ‘single inverted commas’ for the referents of indexical expressions. The two last-mentioned 
items are represented within the discourse that may be associated with a given stretch of text, in conjunction with an 
appropriate context. It is essential that you distinguish amongst these three constructs in your own analyses, by using the 
relevant means of expression or notation.  
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• Finally, in psycholinguistic terms, it is quite implausible that hearers would need to keep in short-term 
auditory memory a particular expression (the “textual antecedent”) in order to interpret a later anaphor 
— which is what the co-textual account of anaphora would entail, of course;5 in the written form, this 
possibility is in principle available to readers, since the co-text remains permanently visible on the page. 
But even here, according to psycholinguists (Ehrlich & Rayner 1983; Charolles & Sprenger-Charolles 
1989), eye regressions by readers to a relevant textual antecedent are relatively rare. Why? Because 
they are tracking the referents represented in their respective discourse models as the discourse is 
constructed on-line (in fact, the introduction and updating of particular discourse referents is an integral 
part of the very creation of discourse itself). The referents of given anaphors are not to be found ‘in’ the 
text, but rather are available in (or via) the discourse representation. 
 
The advantages of the notion antecedent trigger in relation to the canonical textual 
antecedent are that it is more general than the classical “textual antecedent”, as it covers a 
whole range of non-canonical types of anaphora (see the very similar notion of attracteur 
proposed by Berrendonner, 1990).  
As a percept, an utterance token or a non-verbal signal, it is operative in the cases 
of “evolving reference”, “associative” anaphora, exophora, inferential or “indirect” anaphora, 
in discourse deixis as well as in instances of standard, canonical anaphora. See my 2010 
Functions of Language paper for examples of all of these subtypes.  
The antecedent trigger contributes the ontological category or type of the anaphor’s 
referent, as we have just noted; but the actual referent itself and its characterization are 
determined by a whole range of factors: what will have been predicated of it up to the point of 
retrieval, the nature of the coherence/rhetorical relation invoked in order to integrate the two 
discourse units at issue, and the particular character of the anaphoric or “host” predication.  
So whether the referent retrieved via a given anaphor has been directly and explicitly 
evoked in the prior or following co-text (in the case of cataphora) is neither a sufficient nor a 
necessary condition for the existence of (discourse) anaphora.  
Figure 1 is a schematic representation of the distinction between antecedent trigger 
and antecedent as I conceive it, as well as of the different domains in which each operates 
(respectively, those of text and discourse):  
___________________________________________________________________________                                                                                                                                                          
   DISCOURSE 
              Real time line 
 
referent (en) introduced  ………….. : (en) accrues new properties/relationships/attributes (“antecedent”) 
        TEXT  
  Real time line    
   
 
antecedent_trigger___________________________anaphor________________________________________ 
 
Figure 1:  Discourse, text and the relationships between “antecedent-trigger”, “referent”, “antecedent” 
and “anaphor” 
 
As is evident from this diagram, the antecedent trigger is part of some particular text 
(broadly construed, as we have seen) and may evoke a referent, which is mentally represented 
within the discourse (see the first dark (blue) arrow pointing obliquely upwards towards the 
discourse representation above). This representation then accrues certain properties, relations 
                                                
4 
  In any case, the addressee or reader will not know in advance of the occurrence of the anaphor which “textual antecedent” 
to retain in short-term memory. So the problem is compounded here.  
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etc. as these are predicated of it in the ensuing text. A subsequently occurring anaphor (a 
linguistic expression) in the following co-text then enables the addressee or reader to access 
this representation as it has evolved up to the point of retrieval. This is an illustration of 
Heraclitus’s famous point that “you never step into the same river twice”.  
 
2.1 Deixis and anaphora: a discourse-functional perspective  
 
2.1.1 Definitions 
 
Deixis and anaphora are discourse-referential procedures which users exploit in order 
to build up, modify and access the content of mental models of the discourse under 
construction by each of the discourse participants (see also the term “mémoire discursive” 
proposed by Alain Berrendonner).  Both of these procedures operate as a function of the 
principle of “recipient design”, serving to coordinate the attention of speaker and addressee 
(or writer and reader).  
Deixis serves prototypically to orientate the addressee/reader’s attention focus towards 
a new object of discourse (or towards a new aspect of an already existing object at the point of 
use) that is constructed by default on the basis of the utterance context —whose centre point 
or “origo” in Bühler’s (1990)/[1934] terminology is the here and now of the speaker/writer’s 
goal-directed verbal and non-verbal activity (see also Diessel, 2006: 470).  
Deixis in this conception implies the exploitation of the context of utterance (the 
deictic ground in Hanks’ 1992 terminology) in order to profile a discourse-new referent or a 
new conception of a referent existing within the discourse model. We have to do with deixis 
every time we have recourse (by default) to the utterance context in order to identify the 
referent intended by the speaker. The use of the deictic referring procedure always entails a 
break in the continuity of the discourse prior to the point of use.  
As for anaphora, the occurrence of an anaphor in conjunction with the clause in 
which it occurs (i.e. the “host” clause) serves as a signal or an instruction to maintain the 
attention focus already established at the time of speech.  In this way, the referents of weakly 
accented or unaccented anaphors, with low pitch (i.e. which are not phonologically 
prominent), are assumed to enjoy a relatively high degree of attention focus at the point of 
use. That is, they are relatively topical referents. Anaphora consists in the retrieval in the 
context of a given deictic ground of a figure (a central discourse object) together with that 
ground. The anaphoric predication as a whole serves to continue that ground (see also Kleiber 
1994: Ch. 3).   
In both cases, it’s the conceptualisation, i.e. the psychological, mental 
representation of the referents, that is at issue, whether these referents have been made 
accessible initially via the external situation or by the preceding (or following) co-text. There 
exist different “fields” or domains of reference6 within which the deictic as well as anaphoric 
procedures may operate:  
The utterance situation  
  Pure deixis  
(4) Hey, look at that! [The speaker gestures towards a strange bird perched on a 
nearby tree]  
Anaphora (more accurately, “exophora”)  
                                                
6 See in this respect Bühler’s notion of Zeigfelder (“pointing” or “indexical fields”) (Bühler 1934/1990).  
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(5) [A and B are walking on a pavement, and on turning sharp left, notice a big dog 
slowly approaching] A to B: Do you think it’s friendly? (Cornish, 1999: ex. 4.1, p. 
112) 
The co-text  
Text deixis  
(6) A to B: Our rhododendrons are in blossom right now. B: Oh really? How do you 
spell that? 
Anaphora 
(7)…I know it’s got three “d”’s.  
The discourse already constructed or anticipated  
Discourse deixis 
(8) Listen to this: a man went into a butcher’s shop one day wanting to buy a whole 
sheep, and…  
Anaphora 
(9) …Would you believe it?  
Shared long-term memory  
“Recognitional” anadeixis 
(10) A: Do you remember that time we got rained out camping in Spain last August?  
Anaphora 
(11) B: I do indeed! It was really awful, wasn’t it?  
There is also the “displaced” or transposed field corresponding to the creation of a fictitious, 
virtual world (Bühler’s “Deixis am Phantasma”).  
Now, what is the essential difference between the anaphoric (“exophoric”) 
functioning of the pronoun it in (5) and the deictic value of the use of that in (4)? Well, the 
existence of the intended referent as well as its high degree of psychological saliency is 
presupposed in the former case, but asserted (more accurately, demonstrated) in the latter 
(see Cornish 1999: Ch. 4 for a discussion of exophora).   
As for text deixis, the “field” is evidently the co-text (see example (6) above …How 
do you spell that?); whereas with discourse deixis, it’s the surrounding discourse which has 
just been constructed (or which is just about to be, in the case of example (8) Listen to 
this:…), which is the target of the addressee’s processing in order to appropriate the intended 
referent.  
By hypothesis, the 4th type of field indicated above (see ex. (10)) involves both 
anaphora (in the sense that an existing (but currently inactive) discourse representation is 
thereby retrieved from shared long-term memory) and deixis (via the recourse to the 
utterance situation in order to point towards a representation buried in shared long-term 
memory). This type of use would fall within “anadeixis” (see Ehlich, 1982 and subsection 2.2 
below).  
In all four types of domain retained, the deictic uses illustrated by examples (4), (6), 
(8) and (10) orientate the addressee’s attention focus towards a new object of reference, 
thereby creating a joint or shared attention span. The anaphoric uses exemplified by (5), (7), 
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(9) and (11), on the other hand, presuppose an already-established joint attention focus on 
some entity.  
Deixis and anaphora can operate, then, on the utterance context, on the co-text, on the 
surrounding discourse already constructed or anticipated, on shared memory representations 
or on transposed, virtual worlds. In fact, this is only true in terms of the immediate sources of 
the indexical reference in question: for in every case, deixis as well as anaphora function in 
terms of discourse-model representations of the fields at issue. But the nature of each type of 
referring procedure is distinct.  
2.2. “Anadeixis” 
Yet the relationship between deixis and anaphora is asymmetrical: these are by no 
means “absolute” or autonomous indexical referring procedures. As Lyons (1975) 
convincingly argued (cf. also Bühler 1990/1934; Gerner 2009 and others), anaphora is 
derivative upon deixis, on which it depends. Deixis is the more fundamental referring 
procedure. The majority of indexical expression types capable of realising anaphora may also 
have a deictic function (or are morphologically derived from those that are specialised in this 
use). The real relationship between these two indexical procedures may be characterised in 
terms of a cline, with a medium term: this intermediate, hybrid level has been termed 
“anadeixis” by Ehlich (1982).  
‘Anadeixis’7 is the type of indexical reference which combines the anaphoric and 
deictic procedures to different degrees: the indexical expressions which realise it (mainly 
demonstrative-based ones) are anaphoric to the extent that their referent is already 
(potentially) present in the discourse representation assumed by the speaker to be shared by 
speaker and addressee at the point of occurrence, and is retrieved or created via this reference; 
however, that referent may be less than highly salient at the point of use, unlike the situation 
which prevails with canonical anaphora. This is why the deictic procedure is a contributory 
factor in such references. An anadeictic reference is not canonically deictic, in that there is no 
totally new referent being introduced into the discourse thereby, and not all the utterance-level 
parameters are being altered via this reference. For examples of anadeixis, see (6), (8) and 
(10) above as illustrations of text deixis, discourse deixis, and “recognitional” anadeixis, 
respectively. I’ll deal with ‘strict’ anadeixis and discourse deixis shortly. See Cornish (2011: 
757-60) for further discussion. 
The prototypical subtype of anadeixis (what I call “‘strict’ anadeixis”) lies in the 
anaphoric use of demonstratives (whether pronouns or NPs), where they reorientate the 
interlocutor’s attention towards a referent that has already been evoked in the surrounding 
discourse, but which is no longer topical at the point where the retrieval is to be made; 
alternatively, where a macro-topical discourse referent has just been introduced and needs to 
be fully installed in the addressee/reader’s short-term memory span. In neither of these cases 
would an unstressed 3
rd
 person pronoun be capable of maintaining (re-topicalising) the 
intended referent —its indexical vocation being canonically anaphoric (see its relatively ‘low’ 
position in the Scale in Fig. 2 below).  
Here is an attested example to illustrate:   
  
 (12) “‘Strict’ anadeixis”: “…“We use Viking as a shorthand term and there’s the 
traditional raping and pillaging image of the Vikings. That was replaced in the 
1970s by what I think of as the fluffy bunny school of Viking studies…””. 
                                                
7 The term is due to Ehlich (1982), though Ehlich himself did not define it in theoretical terms; nor did he distinguish the 
three sub-types developed in this paper.  
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(Extract from an article by Mark Brown “‘Stunning’ Viking find of silver coins 
and jewellery bought for the nation”, The Guardian 28/08/09, p. 12).  
 
In (12), the referent targeted by the (‘strict’) anadeictic pronoun that is introduced in 
the initial sentence via a predicating NP (“there’s [the traditional raping and pillaging image 
of the Vikings]”) — which is, moreover, in Focus position within an existential construction. 
The demonstrative could not be replaced naturally by an ordinary pronoun (here, it: ?It was 
replaced in the 1970s by…).  This is because this referent is not yet installed as a topic within 
the reader’s developing mental discourse model (the host sentence corresponds to a “thetic —
“all-new” information—judgement”, and so requires a more substantial indexical reference in 
order to achieve this result: the ‘distal’ demonstrative pronoun that fits the bill perfectly here). 
Note also the distancing effect of the use of that in (12), in reference to the earlier, older 
image in question, which has been replaced by the more recent one.   
 
Here now (as already anticipated) is the Scale representing the relative degrees of 
indexicality intrinsic to a range of indexical expression types in English —pronouns and 
lexical NPs (see footnote 8 for the key to the abbreviations used in this Figure):  
 
   Deixis                                      Anaphora 
 
 
   1st/2nd pp  > Pdm adv >  [Ddm adv >  Pdm NP  >  Ddm NP >  Pdmp >  Ddmp >  Df NP] > 3rdpp >  3rd pRp8 
    I/you          here/now    there/then     this N           that N         this         that         the N       he/she... himself... 
      <-------------------------------anadeixis-----------------------------> 
 
Figure 2: Scale of anaphoricity and deicticity coded by certain categories of indexical expressions  
 
The rationale for the hierarchy lies in the degree of inherent ‘indexicality’ of each 
individual indexical category retained. The two poles are occupied, respectively, by 1st and 2nd 
person personal pronouns, which are primary deictics functioning token-reflexively9 and may 
not normally be used anaphorically, and by 3rd person reflexive pronouns, which (at least 
when unstressed in English) prototypically function only anaphorically as bound variables 
within a highly constrained clause-bound context (see §2.3 below on this).  In both these 
“polar” instances, the use of a token of each type of indexical in the appropriate context is 
actually sufficient to ensure the establishment of its referent (though  for very different 
reasons).  
I have ordered the demonstrative-based expression types ranged in between the two 
polar categories on the Scale in terms of the proximal (marked) vs. distal (unmarked) 
distinction which they carry morphologically in English —the marked counterpart bearing a 
higher degree of indexicality than the unmarked one (cf. Lyons 1975 and Levinson 2004: 121, 
n. 4). The use of the proximal variants (here, now, this N, this) is associated with the 
speaker’s personal involvement in the act of reference at hand, while that of the distal ones 
(there, then, that N, that) connotes either an interactive alignment with the addressee or a 
distancing emphasis on the speaker’s part with respect to the situation denoted: see the 
referential value in context of the pronoun that in (12) above).  
                                                
8
 Key to the abbreviations used in Figure 2: ‘1st/2nd/3rd pp’: “first/second/third person pronoun”; ‘P’: “proximal”; ‘D’: 
“distal”; ‘dm’: “demonstrative”; ‘adv’: “adverb”; ‘NP’: “noun phrase”; ‘p’: “pronoun”; ‘Df’: “definite”; ‘R’: “reflexive”. 
9 ‘Token-reflexivity’ corresponds to the situation where it is sufficient for a primary deictic expression token to be uttered in 
a given context for the referent to be established: for example, the person who utters the 1st person pronoun I (or its 
accusative form me) in some context sets him- or herself up by so doing as current speaker.  
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  The lexical NPs on the Scale are placed to the left of the corresponding pronouns. All 
demonstrative-based categories occur above the definite NP category: definite NPs are 
located at the lower limit of the ‘anadeictic’ span in Fig. 2, since although not always 
indexical in function,10 they may still function deictically as well as anadeictically and 
anaphorically. 
Unlike in demonstrative NPs, the head noun in singular definite NPs normally conveys 
presupposed information at the time of utterance. The expression as a whole presupposes the 
uniqueness of the intended referent within the activated shared set of referents, and refers 
inclusively to all the members of the set, under Hawkins’ (1978) account. This means that 
definite NPs are more suited than are demonstrative NPs to realising anaphora rather than 
deixis. Demonstrative-based expressions, on the other hand, carry no presupposition of the 
uniqueness of their referent (just the reverse, in fact), and refer exclusively to one member (or 
one subset of members) within a given shared set of entities. See also C. Lyons (1999) on this 
issue.  
Note also that placing definite NPs closer to the ‘anaphoric’ pole of the Scale than 
demonstrative expression types is contrary to both Ariel’s (1990) and Gundel, Hedberg & 
Zacharski’s (1993) hierarchies, which are exclusively based on the cognitive accessibility or 
cognitive status of the potential referents claimed to be coded by expressions corresponding to 
each position on the Scales.11  Phylogenetically (i.e. in terms of the creation by each language 
of new expression types in the course of its historical evolution), this reflects the diachronic 
development of the definite article, in those languages which possess it, from an earlier 
demonstrative form, rather than vice versa.  This is also the case as far as 3rd person pronouns 
are concerned. 
 
2.3 Anaphora vs. Coreference 
 
A word now on the basic distinction between anaphora and coreference.  
 
Anaphora involves a relation of referential and/or semantic dependency between an 
indexical expression in some co-text and a referent or sense which is independently available 
(and accessible) within the discourse context of the occurrence of that expression.  
Coreference on the other hand is a relation holding between two co-occurring 
expressions used in some text to refer to the same entity. There is not necessarily any relation 
of semantic and/or referential dependency holding between each such use, as there is in the 
case of anaphora.  
For example, if in a text we find the following occurrences: “…David Cameron… the 
British Prime Minister in 2011…”, then it would be the case that each nominal is 
independently referential. That is, either nominal would, on its own, be sufficient to enable 
the addressee or reader to identify the same particular individual that the speaker/writer has in 
mind. There is no referential dependency of one upon the other (both nominals could be 
inverted without any consequences. This is not normally the case with expressions related in 
terms of anaphora, however, where so-called “backwards anaphora”, in which the anaphor 
precedes the antecedent-trigger, is more highly constrained than “forwards anaphora”).  So 
these are examples of “coreference without anaphora”.  
                                                
10
 They may refer independently in terms of their lexical content when this is sufficient to uniquely identify their referent. 
Such definite NPs are “referentially autonomous” expressions, in Ariel’s (1996) terminology, and not context-bound, as are 
the indexical expressions analysed here. In a given textual context, such expanded definite NPs may be introductory rather 
than subsequent (anaphoric or anadeictic) references.  
11 Regarding Ariel’s (1990) characterisation, see the criticism in De Mulder (1997: 147-8). 
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Given that anaphora involves semantic and/or referential dependency, then it is 
possible to have anaphora without coreference, i.e. where no “reference” is involved. This is 
the case with “co-semy” (same sense), as in Mary bought an ice-cream this morning, and I 
had one too. The indefinite pronoun one in the second conjunct of this example is interpreted 
as denoting ‘the same type of entity’ as its antecedent-trigger, here “ice-cream”. We are not 
buying “the same” ice-cream (i.e. it’s not the same referent that is at issue here), but each of 
us will have a different one. Yet it is a referent of the same type.  
Another example of anaphora without coreference is so-called “bound” anaphora 
involving pronouns. Example: At some time in life, everyone thinks he is a failure. The 3rd 
person pronoun he in the subordinate clause here doesn’t refer to anyone in particular. In fact, 
it doesn’t “refer” at all. It is equivalent to a variable, bound by the (“universal”) quantifier 
associated with everyone (see the paper by Christian Bassac on this topic). To make this clear, 
you could add whoever they might be after everyone. The meaning then of the main clause is: 
“everyone thinks/considers himself to be a failure”. So the interpretation of he is completely 
taken charge of by this expression. Again, no “coreference” is involved.  
Finally, anaphora with coreference is illustrated as follows: John knows the answer to 
that question. He’s just memorized a whole encyclopedia.  Here, the pronoun he is referential, 
and its reference depends on the prior existence (as well as saliency, topicality) in the 
discourse context of the referent named ‘John’, just mentioned in the preceding sentence. So 
it is anaphoric with respect to that prior referent. But it also co-refers with the antecedent 
trigger at issue.  
Anaphora, then, involves semantic and/or referential, but not “textual”, dependency.  
 
On ‘coreference’ in naturally occurring texts, see the recent article by Recasens, Hovy and 
Martí (2011) in Lingua 121 (see the General Reference list for the full details).  
 
3. “Topic chains” in texts 
A topic chain (sometimes also called “anaphoric chain” or “referential chain” in the literature) 
is a structured sequence of references developing a single discourse referent within a text. 
There are major, “macro-topical” chains, and more minor, subsidiary ones, termed “micro-
topical” chains. By definition, macro-topical chains are developed both in major discourse 
units as well as in minor, supporting ones throughout a text, whereas micro-topical ones tend 
only to occur within background units.   
(13) Once upon a time there was a king who was wise and venerable (1i). Now this 
king/?#he (2i) had three young and handsome sons (1j). These 
sons/#Them/?These (2j), he (3i) was keen to marry ?them/ø (2j) off, as he (3i) 
was no longer very rich and ø (3i) needed the dowries… 
In this (invented) beginning of a fairy story, the numbers indicated in parentheses 
show the link position within the respective topic chains occupied by the indexical expression 
at issue (see Table 2 below). The subscripted letters (here ‘i’ and ‘j’) indicate the identity or 
non-identity of the chains in question (whose ‘heads’ are, respectively, ‘the wise and 
venerable king’ (i) and ‘the set of his three sons’ (j)).  
The first of these two chains (a king who was wise and venerable…this 
king…he…he…ø) will have introduced in initial position a referent termed ‘New Topic’ by 
S.C. Dik (1997). This referent is introduced in Focus position in the initial sentence of the 
text, in the information-structural sense of the term: this reflects the fact that the conventional 
presentational construction Once upon a time…(‘Il était une fois…’) is a strong signal that the 
 13 
referent thereby introduced will be the global (or “macro-”) topic of the anticipated ensuing 
discourse as a whole, and that it is expected to persist centrally throughout the discourse.  
So it’s this considerable effort of cognitive construction of a leading protagonist in the 
story about to be told that requires it to be retrieved almost immediately via an indexically 
‘strong’ expression (here a demonstrative NP that repeats just the head noun of the textual 
introducer of this character), rather than via a simple unstressed pronoun (he). This is 
equivalent to a kind of “re-introduction” of the referent at issue at this point in the text. Once 
the identity of this highly topical referent is established as such in the reader’s discourse 
representation, it may be retrieved (maintained) quite naturally via a sequence of 3rd person or 
zero pronouns within the 3rd link in the chain.  
The second topic chain evoked in this text fragment is grounded upon an introductory 
reference which is less highly focused than the first — the case of the referent ‘the set of three 
sons of the king in question’: indeed, this referent is presented as subsidiary to or dependent 
on the king. It is thus a secondary topic, the three sons being introduced into the discourse as 
offspring of the central protagonist, the king himself. This topic chain is                                                                                                 
realised in textual terms thus: ø three young and handsome sons…these sons…them.      
Extrapolating, we see that each topic chain involves up to three links:   
An initial, introductory link (L1) which serves to present the referent within the 
discourse; a second link (L2), whose purpose is to confirm the installation of this referent as 
a macro-topic within the addressee/reader’s mental discourse model; and a third link (L3), 
which may be filled by multiple occurrences of indexical expressions. These serve simply to 
maintain the high saliency of the topical referent at issue. The indexicals fulfilling this L3 
function are anaphoric expressions, used as such.  
Table 2 shows the types of nominal expressions capable of realising each of the three 
functional positions within a given topic chain.  
L1 (introductory function) L2 (“anadeixis”)  L3 (anaphora) 
Full proper names Demonstrative NPs  3
rd
 person pronouns 
Extended definite NPs Demonstrative pronouns  Zero pronouns 
Indefinite or quantified NPs Definite (extended) NPs  Reduced def./poss. NPs
      Reduced proper names  
 
Table 2: Types of nominal expressions capable of realising each link in a topic chain 
 
The types of expressions realising the L1 position are “referentially autonomous” 
expressions (i.e. ones that do not require the addressee/reader to have recourse to the context 
at hand in order to access the intended referent —as examples, see the two NPs given in 
illustration of coreference without anaphora in §2.3 above); those realising L2 are 
“referentially semi-autonomous”, and those in L3 position are “referentially non-
autonomous” (since they are by definition entirely bound to the context for their resolution). 
Positions L1 and L3 are obligatory, that is, they must normally be filled, hence “realised”.  In 
the news article I presented for analysis in my (2006) Encyclopedia of Language and 
Linguistics entry on “Discourse anaphora”, namely “Monet waterlilies set £20m record”, it 
transpired that in discourse terms, chains which are subsidiary or background may not 
recognise the 2nd position (L2). This link is only filled when the topic referent is a major 
discourse referent —that is, when it plays a central role in the situation evoked via the text. In 
such a case, it is important that the addressee/reader strongly establishes the intended referent 
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in his/her cognitive representation of the discourse as a macro-topic entity, which will be 
playing a prominent role in the expected remainder of the discourse.  
To end this section, here is an analogy which may help to clarify the relevance of topic 
chains to discourse reference as well as text structuring. Chains structured in terms of the 
three key positions (“Head”, L2 and L3) may be conceived by analogy with the structure of a 
rocket launching a probe to explore a heavenly body in our solar system.  The lower part of 
the rocket would provide the basic thrust needed to launch the heavy rocket into the 
atmosphere at a speed necessary for its subsequent voyage in space. This lower section would 
then be analogous to the ‘introductory’ function of the 1st link position in topic chains, which 
serves to introduce a discourse-new referent (which is not yet “topical” in status).  
Next, the “intermediate” part of the rocket would provide the boost needed to cross the 
terrestrial atmosphere and counteract the gravity which tends to pull flying objects back to the 
Earth’s surface. This intermediate section would be comparable to the function of the 2nd link 
in topic chains, which precisely enhances the topicality inherent in the referent which has just 
been introduced, and firmly installs it in the addressee/reader’s discourse.   
Subsequently, once the frontier between the upper layer of the Earth’s atmosphere and 
interstellar space will have been crossed, the two lower sections of the initial rocket will 
detach themselves and fall back to Earth, leaving the probe to freely pursue its journey 
towards the target. Given the absence of any atmosphere or gravity in interstellar space, the 
probe will quietly pursue its way at a constant speed. This would be analogous to what 
happens in a topic chain when we reach link 3: here, the purely anaphoric expressions require 
no particular cognitive effort (unlike links 1 and 2), since the referent at issue is already 
(highly) topical within the discourse at hand.  It is, so to speak, virtually “self-propelling”.  
 
4.  “Micro-discourse”: indexicals and their role in the creation of discourse coherence  
 
Between 2003 and 2006, we conducted an ILF research project entitled Relations de 
cohérence et fonctionnement des anaphores in partnership between the UTM research unit 
ERSS (axe S’caladis) and the unit EA 1339 from l’université de Strasbourg II. The 
culmination of this project was the publication of a selection of 6 articles in a special issue of 
the Journal of French Language Studies (issue 19.2, July 2009). The core of the project was 
an investigation into the interactions within short written non-literary French texts (news-in-
brief articles from newspapers, advertisements and film synopses), between the choice of a 
coherence or rhetorical relation and the functioning of certain anaphoric (indexical) 
expressions in non-initial sentences, in integrating the interpretation of a sequence of 
sentences that were not explicitly connected (see (14) below for an English illustration of the 
kind of texts we studied).  
 
In particular, we studied the heuristic role of:      
-  …the various types of indexical expressions in the setting up of a coherence relation  
-  …certain connectives (d’abord, puis, notamment, en particulier…) 
-  …the tense and grammatical aspect, as well as the Aktionsart (lexical aspect), of 
the predicators involved; and more generally, the event structure of the units to be 
integrated  
-  …the lexical relations characterising each predicator (e.g. synonymy, hyponymy  
(sense inclusion), antonomy, meronymy (part-whole relations)) 
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-  …the information structure of the two units at issue (topic-focus, contrastive 
topic/focus, “all-focus”) 
-  …the title of the text in question, and  
- …the syntactic correlations existing between the two sentences or clauses involved 
(e.g. gerundives, participials…)  
We also re-examined and on occasion reformulated a small number of coherence relations, as 
these had been developed in the relevant literature: in particular, Elaboration, but also 
Background, Explanation and Result, as a function of our corpora.  
The role played by indexicals in the cohesion and coherence of multi-clausal texts is 
fundamental. Invoking one or more semantic-pragmatic relations holding between the 
discourse units that correspond to the indexical predication and the ‘target” unit, as a function 
of the particular coherence relation assumed in order to integrate them into a higher order 
unit, is one condition on the isotopy needed for the indexical in question to maintain, by 
retrieving it, a salient (or less than salient) referent. If no relevant type of rhetorical or 
coherence relation is available in context to integrate the two units, then the indexical(s) in the 
second one will be uninterpretable. Moreover, in textual examples like (14),  
 
  (14)  “Paulson offered treasury role 
President Bush nominated Henry Paulson, the chief executive of Goldman 
Sachs, as US treasury secretary in place of John Snow. The 60-year-old 
investment banker is a China expert and keen environmentalist.” (The 
Guardian Weekly 9-15/06/06, p. 2) 
it is clear that the relation Entity Elaboration which may be invoked in order to integrate the 
macro-units corresponding to both sentences of the text, can only “elaborate” the topical 
individual introduced in the discourse unit correlating with the initial sentence (as also in the 
title). For the text is evidently “about” Henry Paulson, and not John Snow: it’s HP who is to 
be the new US treasury secretary, JS bowing out (yielding his position to HP).  JS is no longer 
in post, and the reader does not expect that the rest of the text (should there be any) will be 
about him at all.  A predication can only predicate something new about a referent which has 
been singled out as being susceptible to receiving new information. So it’s the first-mentioned 
referent which is the target of the extended definite NP subject of the second sentence (the 60-
year-old investment banker) —even though this NP could (in principle, at least) target the 
referent ‘John Snow’. Note that we learn something new about the entity at issue (Henry 
Paulson) from the content of the anaphor, in relation to what the antecedent had evoked (this 
is a regular feature of the news journalism genre).  
The key point here is that the anaphoric relation holding between the indexical the 60-
year-old investment banker and ‘Henry Paulson’, the macro-topical referent in this short text, 
provides the anchoring ‘pivot’ needed in order for the coherence relation Entity-Elaboration 
to integrate the two discourse units into a higher level unit. This is a prerequisite then for 
understanding the text as a whole (i.e. for deriving the ‘discourse’ that may be associated with 
that ‘text’): indeed, to “elaborate” a particular entity, that entity has to figure both in the 
elaborated situation and in the elaborating one.  In the textual examples containing indexicals 
in my 2010 article in Functions of Language (as also in the 2009 one in Language Sciences), 
the relations Claim-Evidence, Concession, (Entity-) Elaboration, Explanation, Result and 
Sequence turned out to be relevant. See Kehler et al. (2007) for further discussion of the 
interactions between coherence and coreference relations in texts.  
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5. Discourse anaphora, anadeixis and the structuring of (macro-)discourse 
 
5.1 ‘Strict’ anadeixis and discourse deixis   
 
In several publications (see section 5 of the first list of References at the end of the handout), I 
studied the textual behaviour of demonstratives, in particular in realising two types of 
anadeixis: ‘strict’ anadeixis, and discourse deixis. ‘Strict’ anadeixis is realised by what 
Diessel (1999) calls “anaphoric demonstratives” (see example (12)). In the first and fourth of 
the publications in section 5 of the References, I sketched out an analysis of the structuring 
function, in terms of discourse, of demonstratives realising in particular a discourse deictic 
function.  
With discourse deixis, the addressee/reader operates on the surrounding discourse 
which has just been constructed in order to appropriate (or to create, rather) the intended 
referent. See Lyons (1977), Guillot (2007), Himmelmann (1996) and Diessel (1999) on this 
topic. Unlike in the case of “strict” anadeixis, with discourse deixis, there is no pre-existing 
discourse referent to target at the point at which the discourse-deictic reference occurs.  
 
 (15)  Discourse deixis: ““…Every day, people hide heartache and pain in public. I 
think audiences recognise that fragility and are drawn to it”…”. (Extract from 
an article entitled “Pulling Power”, Radio Times 1-7.08.09, p. 18).  
 
In (15), we have a demonstrative NP introduced by a demonstrative determiner and a head 
noun denoting a psychological quality (“fragility”) in context, which serves to reclassify the 
other two 3rd order (abstract) referents already introduced, setting up a more general property 
which is reified, on the basis of the more specific psycho-physical qualities (“heartache” and 
“pain”) just evoked via the preceding sentence, and which it subsumes. Note that ‘fragility’ is 
not, strictly speaking, a hyperonym of ‘heartache’ and ‘pain’ as such—rather, this is a 
subjective characterisation on the writer’s part.12  This is a discourse-deictic use, then.  
As such, the demonstrative NP which realises it within its host clause could not be 
replaced by a 3rd person pronoun at all (#...I think audiences recognise it and…): for an 
unstressed 3rd person pronoun serves simply to maintain within the host clause the already 
high saliency of a given discourse referent at the point of retrieval (see Figure 2).  But this is 
not the case here. The referent needs to be constructed and installed in the evolving discourse 
model, and it’s via a demonstrative-based expression that this is achieved.  
Moreover, whereas in (12) (an instance of ‘strict’ anadeixis) the demonstrative 
pronoun that could well be replaced by a definite NP whose head is the same noun as the one 
used in the antecedent-trigger NP: The image was replaced in the 1970s by…, such a 
replacement would be totally unacceptable in the case of (15), repeating the indexical NP’s 
head noun: #I think audiences recognise the fragility and…13 This shows clearly that, unlike 
(12), (15) does not involve anaphora stricto sensu, as such. This contradicts what is claimed 
by Piwek et al. (2008: 697), namely that “discourse deixis” is nothing more than a form of 
discourse anaphora. All this is consistent with the predictions that may be derived from the 
Scale of indexicality in Fig. 2.  
 
                                                
12 See Schnedecker (2006) for the various types of predicate used in demonstrative NPs in French. 
13 The essential reason for this is that the property “fragility” cannot easily be presupposed of the intended referent at the 
point of use, which it would normally be when the exponent noun is head of a definite NP — so it is not an anaphoric (or 
‘strict’ anadeictic) reference.  
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Figure 3 presents the different indexical referring procedures we have seen so far, also in the 
form of a Scale:  
 
Canonical deixis >  Discourse deixis  >  Recognitional deixis > ‘Strict’ anadeixis > 
Canonical anaphora 
 
Figure 3: Scale of indexical referring procedures 
 
The ‘anadeixis’ span in this Scale ranges from ‘discourse deixis’ to the left, to ‘strict’ 
anadeixis to the right. ‘Recognitional’ anadeixis is placed in between ‘discourse deixis’ and 
‘strict’ anadeixis, because it is a more deictically-oriented referring procedure than the latter 
(since its potential referent is not readily accessible to the addressee/reader, but needs to be 
retrieved from shared long-term memory: recall example (10) from subsection 2.1 earlier on). 
However, unlike ‘discourse deixis’, a potential referent does in fact exist prior to the reference 
effected: it is simply less immediately accessible than in the case of ‘strict’ anadeixis. This 
scalar conception clearly shows that with strict anadeixis, the anaphoric aspect will be 
dominant (‘strict’ anadeixis being located on the Scale closer to the ‘anaphora’ pole), whereas 
with discourse-deixis, it’s the deictic one that predominates: while in the case of ‘strict’ 
anadeixis, the referent is simply being retrieved from prior discourse, with discourse deixis, a 
new referent is being created and installed in the interlocutors’ working memory, as it is via 
the use of the canonical deictic procedure. 
 
5.2 The roles of ‘strict’ anadeixis and discourse deixis in the structuring of discourse 
To illustrate, here is a single short text, taken from my (2011) paper in Language Sciences 
33(5). Like the others presented in that article, this one is drawn from the UK weekly 
magazine Radio Times. This magazine offers a rich tapestry of data, since it contains not only 
film previews and programme notes for TV and Radio, but also feature articles, interviews, 
advertisements, recipes and letters to the editor. Its style is relaxed and informal, often close 
to spontaneous speech. As here, there is therefore a lot of interactivity between writer and 
reader, and the writer is often subjectively involved in his or her discourse. Text (16) is a 
short article previewing a dramatised TV biography.  
(16)   Television by Alison Graham 
WHAT WE’VE BEEN WATCHING 
Of mice and men… 
 
i. Breaking the Mould: the Story of Penicillin (29 July BBC4) was a delightfully old-
fashioned dramatised biography of the type that wouldn’t have looked out of place 
in the 1970s, with perhaps Robert Hardy in the lead role of Nobel Prize-winning 
chemist Professor Howard Florey. 
5. ii. In the 2009 version he was played by Dominic West, a hot property since The 
Wire, who assumed an unobtrusive Australian accent and a very unflattering 
parting. West also revealed a useful skill during the science bits in the lab as a man 
who knows how to insert mice into test tubes. He was very gentle and the stunt-
mice appeared none the worse for their adventures. They probably even had a nice  
10.  little cup of tea afterwards.  
iii. If you could get past the punning title (breaking the mould/penicillin — can 
you see what they did there?), this was a straightforward, thoroughly workmanlike 
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telling of a complex and not, on the face of it, eye-poppingly dramatic story. There 
were no car chases and no-one scaled any high buildings as Professor Florey and  
15.  his team developed penicillin in huge qualities, saving countless lives. (On moral 
grounds, he refused to patent the process and exploit it commercially).   
iv.     But this very earnestness was part of Breaking the Mould’s retro charm. There 
was even a British actor (Oliver Dimsdale) with a delightful “Cherman” accent as 
Dr Ernst Chain, Florey’s colleague. It made me go all misty-eyed for the days of 
20.  Anthony Valentine as Major Mohn in Colditz. (Article in Radio Times, 8-14.08.09, 
p. 47).  
 
I have written the indexical referring expressions bearing a purely anaphoric discourse value 
in this text in italics, and those with a deictic or anadeictic function in boldface.  
Note first of all that 3rd person pronouns (apart from the occurrence of the pronoun he 
in line 5) and possessive NPs, but also reduced Proper nouns (e.g. West, l. 7, Florey’s, l. 20), 
occur exclusively within elementary discourse units (whether central or subsidiary) and 
signal intra-unit continuity. The one exception to this generalisation is the occurrence of the 
3rd person pronoun he in line 5. This pronoun refers back to ‘the lead role of Howard Florey’, 
a referent introduced in the previous paragraph (which corresponds in discourse terms to a 
distinct discourse unit). However, this reference is felt to be awkward here: this is due to the 
fact that there is a conflict between the effect of referential and thematic continuity associated 
with the use of a 3rd person pronoun, and the break in continuity conveyed via the start of a 
new textual paragraph, headed by a “framing adverbial” (the PP in the 2009 version) which 
sets up a new discourse unit.  
In more “macro-” discourse terms, the theme of 3 of the 4 textual paragraphs (each 
realising a discourse unit) is announced by means of anadeictically-functioning indexicals: 
first, via a definite NP (the 2009 version, a referentially non-autonomous indexical) in line 5, 
para. 2; and later via demonstrative-based expressions: the proximal pronoun this in line 12 
(para. 3), and the demonstrative NP this very earnestness, line 17 (para. 4).  
Now, this demonstrative NP is clearly a discourse-deictic occurrence, since it 
implicitly predicates the property of “earnestness” (Fr. sérieux) of the “worthy”, undramatic 
character of the film’s plot highlighted in the previous paragraph. This in order to make it into 
the topic of the final paragraph (the “Coda” of the article as a whole).  This NP serves to 
signal a transition between two major discourse units of the text, thereby signposting the 
imminence of the concluding unit, which “wraps up” the text as a whole.  
The discourse-deictic character of the reference of this very earnestness in this text 
shows how demonstrative-based expressions occurring unit-initially in a text may enable the 
user to change from one gear to another, discursively speaking — hence to effect a transition 
from a unit serving to introduce a given referent to a new unit, by re-classifying it, 
establishing it as a discourse entity by reifying some aspect of what has been predicated 
within an earlier unit in the discourse. In other words, the processing of such indexicals 
involves looking backwards to the preceding discourse at the same time as looking ahead, 
towards the new unit about to be constructed. It is precisely this which makes them so useful 
for realising this particular discourse function. Note also that, like the characterising noun 
fragility in that fragility in example (15), the use of the head noun earnestness in this very 
earnestness in (16) reflects the writer’s subjective evaluation of what has just been evoked in 
the 3rd major discourse unit, rather than being a relation lexically determined by some head 
lexeme within an antecedent (there isn’t one here, in fact).  
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Now, these discourse-deictic occurrences of demonstratives that initiate a paragraph in 
written texts have several of the distinctive properties that have been attributed to “framing” 
adverbials:  
First, they mark the end of a preceding discourse unit and the start of a new one (they 
signal boundaries between units: the textual segmentation function, then); and second, in 
terms of their descriptive content, they project a wide scope over the sentences/utterances 
which follow them (the integrative function). The demonstrative NP this very earnestness in 
(16) is a very good example of this. As is generally the case with demonstrative NPs, this 
descriptive content is not presupposed of its referent, but serves to (re-)classify the discourse 
material on which the expression operates, or it implicitly predicates some discourse-new 
property of it.  
At the same time, discourse-deictic demonstratives manifest certain of the properties 
of connectives, linking up with the unit that precedes.14  
This last property reflects their residual anaphoric dimension (see Fig. 3). It is their 
essentially deictic dimension which is responsible for the anticipatory character of such 
references — since all uses of demonstratives (whether pure deictic or anadeictic) result in the 
conveying of new information in context.  The user’s obligatory transit via the immediate 
utterance context of the demonstrative in search of an “index” (or “demonstratum”) in order 
to yield a referent, means that its use will cause a break in the continuity of the discourse at 
this point. This break corresponds to the boundary demarcation which the use of 
demonstratives may effect, and the new information to which they give rise in context stems 
from their “anticipatory” dimension.  
 
6. VP and object ellipsis, null and overt pronouns 
 
English being a highly syntacticised language with a fairly rigid word order and little or no 
inflectional morphology, the distribution of null object pronouns (as opposed to subject ones) 
is highly restricted. However, they may occur, in certain circumstances: these are 
characteristically semantic and discourse-pragmatic in character rather than syntactic, 
however. One major issue in this respect is this: in instances of object non-realisation in 
English, are we dealing with ellipsis as such, or with the actual “presence”, underlyingly, of a 
null pronoun with specific discourse-referential properties?  
   McShane (2005: 3) distinguishes between “syntactic ellipsis” (i.e. ellipsis proper) and 
semantic ellipsis. She claims that “Syntactic ellipsis is the nonexpression of a word or phrase 
that is, nevertheless, expected to occupy a place in the syntactic structure of a sentence.” In 
my conception, this is textual in character. The example she gives is of “gapping”, involving 
the verbs of parallel, conjoined clauses:  
   (17) “Mary got an A on the math test and Louise ø a B”.  
Here, the repeated past-tense verb got from the first conjunct is ellipsed in the second. 
Semantic ellipsis, for McShane (2005: 3), is “the nonexpression of elements that, while 
crucial for a full semantic interpretation, are not signaled by a syntactic gap.” With semantic 
ellipsis, there is no syntactic incompleteness involved, only (by definition) semantic.  
                                                
14 In fact, Diessel (1999), (2006) argues that it is this use that has given rise diachronically to grammatical connectives.  
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Examples of this would be (18a,b):  
(18) a.  I forgot [“to take/bring”] my keys. (McShane, 2005: 3) 
               b.  He is reading [“a book written by”] Tolstoy. (Ibid: p. 3)  
The elements in square brackets (my notation) are semantic constructs, part of the meaning 
normally conveyed by such sentences (see my distinction between “text” and “discourse” in 
Table 1), and are not syntactically active constituents.  
6.1 “VP Ellipsis” 
But “syntactic” ellipsis is not, in actual usage at least, restricted to situations where the 
constituent ellipsed is an exact copy of its “antecedent” or controller expression, which is 
simply “substituted” by zero (in fact, this is true generally, whatever the type of anaphoric 
expression at issue). As examples, let me repeat three attested (originally spoken) utterances 
illustrating VP ellipsis, initially presented in Cornish (1997: 9):  
(19) “…They don’t appear to be actually doing anything, yet in fact they obviously are 
ø” (Artist on Arena, BBC2, 05.04.78. Example (6) in Cornish, 1997: 9) 
 
In (19), the antecedent trigger introduces a predicate occurring within the scope of the 
negation of the introducing verb appear. But the elliptical segment “ignores” the effect of the 
logical scope-bearing operator involved (the negative polarity), and accesses the propositional 
function from inside that scope. So the ellipsis is interpreted as “doing something”. Note also 
the relevance of the adversative connective yet and the obligatory contrastive pitch accent on 
ARE here, which help to motivate the ellipsis involved —compensating, as it were, for the 
absence of syntactic parallelism involved here. The coherence relation integrating the two 
conjuncts here is clearly that of Contrast (Kehler, 2002), a “Resemblance” relation. Instating 
in situ an exact copy of the antecedent would lead to severe ungrammaticality as well as to 
semantic incoherence: *…yet in fact they obviously ARE doing anything.  But this would 
seem to contradict Kehler’s (2002) theory, which is that when Resemblance coherence 
relations are operative (as in (19)), then syntactic reconstruction driven by the parallel 
semantic and syntactic structures underlying each clause involved is required.  
 
(20) “[Anthony Hayes] is head of the London agency Hayes & Jarvis, whose well-
healed customers are particularly demanding and knowledgeable, so I think the 
assertion is worth following up, and later on, I will ø.” (The Observer, 
02.05.76. Example (7) in Cornish, 1997: 9) 
 
In (20), the ellipsis accesses the content of the propositional function “x follow up the 
assertion” introduced by the antecedent trigger the assertion is worth following up. The 
coherence relation at work here integrating the first two major discourse units would be 
Cause-Consequence (Result), according to Kehler’s (2002) system; but the one connecting 
the elliptical clause with the immediately preceding one is surely Temporal Sequence, a 
Contiguity coherence relation (according to Kehler’s system). Again, the formal structure 
underlying the syntactically active elliptical predication ((I will) follow it up) is not parallel to 
that of its antecedent trigger (which is in the passive voice, whereas the elliptical fragment is 
in the active): substituting this to the right of the modal auxiliary will via some kind of 
copying mechanism would lead to severe ungrammaticality: *I will the assertion is worth 
following up. Such examples are readily found in corpora of spontaneous speech.  
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(21) “The trouble in Britain is that there are no initiators [of policy in Ministries] —
people try to ø, but…”. (Interviewee, BBC Radio 3, 12.05.84. Example (8) in 
Cornish, 1997: 9).  
 
Finally, in (21), the VP ellipsis is able to access a predication contained in a relational noun 
(a nominalised verb with its arguments): its interpretation here is “initiate policy in 
Ministries”.  This is no doubt facilitated by the evident regular derivational relation holding 
between the agentive noun initiator and the verb initiate (a morphologically “transparent” 
relation). The integrative coherence relation operative here would seem to be Concession 
(“…although people try to initiate policy in Ministries, they nevertheless [don’t succeed in 
doing so]”). Following Kehler’s (2002: Ch. 3) account, it is the type of Coherence relation 
invoked to connect the two discourse units at issue that is relevant as far as the interpretation 
of VP-ellipsed clauses is concerned: Contiguity and Cause-Effect relations do not require 
syntactic parallelism between the two clauses involved, but Resemblance ones do (but the 
Contrast relation involved in (19) is nevertheless a counterexample to this claim).  
 
All three examples show that “VP ellipsis” is not simply a superficial syntactic device 
used for avoiding textual repetition (contra Hankamer & Sag, 1976, as well as Sag & 
Hankamer, 1984), but that it is primarily sensitive to semantic-pragmatic factors (see also 
McShane, 2005 in relation to Russian, Czech and Polish data). On occasion, these factors may 
override the condition which requires syntactic parallelism. This then is a “deep” (semantic) 
rather than “surface” (syntactic) property, according to Sag & Hankamer (1984). See also 
Kehler (2002: 76-9) for a very similar point. Kehler’s chapter 3 surveys a number of semantic 
accounts of VP Ellipsis in the literature, as well as purely syntactic ones, giving evidence in 
favour of each type.  
 
6.2  Object ellipsis, null and overt 3rd person pronouns 
 
6.2.1 The semantic vs. syntactic valency of predicates 
 
Let’s start by briefly distinguishing between the semantic valency of a given predicate and the 
syntactic valency of the verb, adjective or preposition to which it corresponds on the lexical 
level. The semantic valency of a predicate (a semantic notion) corresponds to the number and 
semantic type of its arguments (obligatory participants in the state of affairs which the 
predicate denotes). On the other hand, its lexico-syntactic counterpart (verb, adjective or 
preposition) has what we might call a “syntactic” valency (the number and syntactic category 
of its essential complements). The internal (semantic) arguments of a predicate and the 
(syntactic) complements of a counterpart verb, adjective or preposition may coincide, but they 
may also diverge. Let’s look at the three transitive or ditransitive verbs in (22a-c). 
 
(22)  a   John saw the “No Entry” sign. 
         b   The postman placed the packet in the tray. 
           c   The car hit the railing. 
 
The examples in (23) (below) show that the second, or the second and third arguments of the 
predicates see, place and hit as illustrated in (22) are required both semantically and 
syntactically (even though the 3rd (locative) argument of the verb to place (see (23b)) may be 
ellipsed when it is recoverable via the context):  
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(23) a  * John saw. 
   b  ?The postman placed the packet/*The postman placed in the 
  tray/*The postman placed. 
          c   *The car hit. 
 
6.2.2 Indeterminate vs. generic values of null complements  
 
By contrast, the syntactic valency of the lexical counterparts of the predicates in (24) 
(normally 2-place predicates) may be reduced by one place (complement). This reduction has 
an important effect on the semantics of these predicates (this is the “absolute” use of transitive 
verbs). Yet their semantic valency remains a two-place one. Here, the event structure of the 
predications in (24a,b) is that of an activity (i.e. a “process”, which could in principle go on 
indefinitely), and is no longer that of a telic accomplishment (an event that has an internal 
end-point), as when the second and (when relevant) third arguments are realised syntactically.  
 
(24) a   Ron sawed, and Mildred pruned. 
       b   Hilda read, while Jim wrote.   
 
Further generic or indeterminate referential values of unexpressed arguments are illustrated 
by the following attested examples:   
 
(25)  “See, try, admire or buy at London’s Motor Show.” (Advertisement, The Sunday  
Times, 9.10.83, p. 9) 
 
The kinds of things the reader of this advert is being invited to “see”, “try (out)”, “admire” or 
“buy” (all 2-place predicates and lexically, transitive verbs) are evidently new models of 
motor vehicles and their accessories, exhibited at the Motor Show to which the utterance 
refers. There is no discourse referent to which these arguments refer (what is highlighted are 
the “activities” associated with the meaning of these predicates here, as also in (24a,b)). 
Rather, these are what Van Valin & La Polla (1997) call “inherent arguments”, part of the 
internal lexical semantics of the host predicates at issue. The non-instantiation of the second 
arguments here, together with the use of the imperative mood of each predication, has had the 
effect of converting what would normally be accomplishment predications into activity ones.  
 
(26) [Notice displayed on dustbins in a street in Canterbury, UK:]  
                   “Recycling is so easy when it’s collected from your doorstep.” 
 
We need to distinguish between the values indeterminate and generic associated with null 
complements. The type illustrated by (26) could be analysed as generic, since the initial 
clause as a whole is generic: the tense is the (gnomic) present, and the predication attributes a 
property (“being very easy”) to a type of event rather than to a token (a single occurrence). 
Whereas in (25) the four predications are eventive, each conjunct being in the imperative 
mood, and the actions enjoined are localised within a particular commercial event. So the null 
complements here all have an indeterminate rather than generic value in context. 
  Overt pronouns, for their part, may assume the non-referring generic value illustrated 
by (26) (see example (30b) further on), as well as the indeterminate reading (see (25´) and 
(25´a)):  
 
(25´)  See it, try it, admire it or buy it at London’s Motor Show. 
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Another attested example (also taken from an advertisement) is (25´a): 
 
(25´) a. [Picture of a “Unibond” (colle forte) tube] 
               “You name it 
 This seals it” (Street advertisement for “Unibond”, Broad Oak Road, Sturry, 
UK) 
 
But characteristically, where the host predicator occurs with a null complement, the “activity” 
interpretation is highlighted rather than the telic reading, directed towards a goal. In (25´a), 
the object pronouns could not be replaced by zero forms, since what is in focus here is not the 
activities of “naming” or “sealing” per se, but rather the (undifferentiated) types of physical 
entities that may be the object of the naming and sealing at issue.  
 
6.2.3  Null vs. overt referential-anaphoric pronouns 
 
Let’s end this discussion by comparing the anaphoric potential of null and overt pronouns, as 
a function of the expression of event structure.  
In English, three situations are possible (and attested) as far as the anaphoric 
occurrence of pronominal or null internal arguments is concerned: 
1) the context is compatible both with a null complement and with an overt pronoun;  
2) (very rarely) only the null complement is possible (i.e. null complements are ‘marked’ 
expression types in English, in relation to overt pronouns); or  
3) only an overt pronoun is acceptable.  
In certain languages, there is a different distribution of null and overt pronouns as far as the 
expression of anaphora is concerned: Gujarati (as indeed Asian languages of the Far East in 
general) is a particularly “liberal” language, since it allows either expression type in all 
contexts. Spanish and spoken French are “intermediate” languages in this respect, while 
English is a particularly restrictive language.  
Moreover, the anaphoric interpretation of a null complement seems to conform to two main 
conditions:  
1) there must be a specific semantic selection restriction on the internal argument(s) 
subject to syntactic non-realisation, or alternatively the contextual reference domain 
provides an appropriate type of denotation (see (25) in this respect, in relation to the 
indeterminate reading of null complements).  And…  
2) the referent of the null complement must be contextually salient at the point of use. 
This condition is necessary, but not sufficient, as (27) shows:15  
(27) Martin liked the look of [the pair of walking shoes displayed in the store 
window]i: he went and bought *øi/themi without trying *øi/themi on.  
 
It seems that it is the non-specific nature of the selection restriction associated with the 
lexical-semantic structure of the verbs buy and try on that prevents this type of functioning. 
Only overt 3rd person pronouns can occur in these positions, as (27) shows. Why? Presumably 
because the selection restrictions imposed on the relevant 2nd argument positions by the 
                                                
15 See also the ill-formed examples of 2- or 3- place verbs of achievement or accomplishment followed by a null complement 
in (23) above – where the tense is also the definite past, and where the referent targeted by the null complement may also be 
contextually salient.  
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predicates ‘buy’ (“commercially saleable goods”) and ‘try on’ (“clothes sold in shops”) are 
too general to provide a specific intended referent in context. By contrast, null complements 
with these predicators are perfect when they take on an “activity” sense, whereby they would 
have an “indeterminate”, non-referential value, as in the imperative occurrence of buy in (25). 
In spontaneous spoken French, on the other hand, null complements may well occur in 
referential contexts such as (27), under pragmatic control (…il est allé acheter øi sans essayer 
øi). 
A null complement can also evoke a(n) (in)definite identifiable entity— that is (in the 
former case), a discourse-new referent.  What is crucial in this particular case is that the 
intended referent of the zero form (which may well be a discourse referent) should be 
identifiable for the addressee/reader. Whether or not it is salient at the time of utterance is not 
relevant. The first null complement in (28) illustrates this:  
 
(28) I wrote ø to you a week ago, you know, but you never answered ø! 
The null complement of answered in the second conjunct of (28) illustrates a fourth 
possibility, where an implicit internal argument is not only referential and identifiable, but 
anaphoric. For obvious reasons, a definite 3rd person pronoun could not commute with a null 
complement bearing a discourse-new referent. But this is of course perfectly possible under 
the referential-anaphoric reading (though in (28), the zero pronoun is much more natural in 
context: like the null pronouns in example (32) further on, the second occurrence in (28) may 
instead be replaced by the (metonymically functioning) 1st person pronoun me, showing that 
the reference is essentially deictic here).  
Other verbs, which have more specific selection restrictions, as well as different 
Aktionsart properties, allow both types of markers. Let’s look at a pair of examples presented 
by Groefsema (1995: 156): 
 
(29) a  John picked up the glass of beer and drank ø. 
        b  John picked up the glass of beer and drank it. 
 
Here, the choice of a null complement for drank in (29a) induces a partitive interpretation 
(“John drank only some of the beer in the glass”). The null pronoun is anaphoric, but the null 
instantiation of this predicator’s second argument has changed the “accomplishment” event 
structure in (29b) with the overt pronoun, to an activity predication.16  In (29b) on the other 
hand, ‘John’ is understood as having drunk all the beer in the glass (the overt pronoun 
imposing a holistic interpretation of its referent, so giving the predication as a whole a telic 
accomplishment value, where the event of drinking beer comes to an end point). 
By contrast, in (30a), both predications denote an atemporal property (the predications 
at issue are generic), the second one existing independently of the first —so there is no 
“anaphora” here.  
 
(30) a John drinks only gin, but I [don’t-FC] drink ø. 
     b John drinks only gin, but I [don’t-FC] drink it. (Lehrer, 1970: (67), (68), p.  
245).  
 
In (30a), it’s the conventionally recognised type of denotation ‘alcoholic beverages’ 
associated with the null complementation in the case of drink17 which overrides the purely 
                                                
16 See Van Valin & Lapolla (1997: 112) for arguments that verbs of consumption such as eat and drink are basically activity 
verbs in terms of Aktionsart, but which may also be used transitively as accomplishment predicates.  
17 See the study of the equivalent French verb boire by Mejri & François (2006) in this regard. 
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anaphoric interpretation which would have simply carried over the type of entity at issue, 
namely ‘gin’ here.  So we are dealing here with the generic, non-referential value of the null 
pronoun, as described earlier, and not with the partitive anaphoric reading we saw in (29a): 
note in this respect that the verbs of each conjunct in (30) are in the simple present tense, 
whereas in (29) they were in the preterit (definite past tense).  
In other cases, the referent identified via an anaphoric null or overt pronoun is 
identical (in (31) the host predicator is a preposition, in syntactic terms):18  
 
(31)  “… always lock your car and never leave anything valuable inside ø/it …”  
(Radio  Times, section on “Crime”, p. 114) 
 
The semantics of this preposition is highly specific: “fully contained within a 3-dimensional 
‘hollow’ object”; so this is sufficient to enable the identification of the intended referent 
(which is also highly salient in this context).  
The second of the three broad possibilities indicated earlier (where it is only the null 
complement that is acceptable in context as an anaphor) may be illustrated by the following 
attested example, where the host verb is hit, a verb that denotes some sort of contact with a 
surface, and which doesn’t normally license a null second argument (see (23c) above):  
 
(32) “…It wasn’t moving very quickly, it took between four and five minutes until I 
saw it hit ø… After a few seconds the wave hit ø and smashed against the beach.” 
(Eye-witness account of the tidal wave that hit the town of Patong in Thailand in 
December 2004, BBC News on the web, 30.12.04).  
 
Note in (32) that it would not have been possible at all as a substitute for either of the null 
pronouns here. Clearly, when the reference is vague, giving rise to an “ambient” type of 
interpretation (analogous to the expletive subject of weather verbs, as in It’s raining again!), 
only the null complement is possible. In particular, the more distinctly deictic value 
associated with the use illustrated in (32) can be seen in the possibility of substituting at least 
the first of the null complements here by the inclusive 1st person plural pronoun us. This is a 
primary deictic expression type, occurring at the very top (the left-hand pole) of the Scale of 
indexicality in Fig. 2. Here, the null complement pronoun has the interpretation “the place 
where we were (at the time)”.  
 
To summarize and conclude this section, then, we can say that the generic or 
indeterminate (non-indexical) instances of non-instantiation of second and third (where 
relevant) arguments of a predicator are not actually examples of ellipsis (whether syntactic or 
semantic) at all. This applies to examples (24)-(26), (29a) and (30a).  However, referential-
anaphoric argument non-realisation may be said to correspond to syntactic, rather than 
semantic ellipsis, under McShane’s (2005) definitions. Examples (31) and (32) and the 
second conjunct of (28) would fall under this heading, while the null complement in the first 
conjunct of this example would correspond rather to semantic ellipsis.  
So in the final analysis, what motivates the possibility of not realising one or more 
internal arguments of given predicators is the recoverability of a coherent interpretation in 
context. This also seems to be the case with VP Ellipsis, which we saw in §6.1. If this is 
possible in the context at issue, then the argument(s) can be unrealised syntactically (i.e. 
textually). But if it is not, then they can’t be.  
 
                                                
18 The source text had the null complement in this position, in fact. 
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More generally, after examining the examples in this section in particular, though not 
exclusively, we can say that it is the choice and use of a particular indexical expression token, 
together with its host predication as a whole, which primarily determines its in-context 
interpretation as well as (where relevant) referent. This was particularly in evidence with the 
three attested examples of VP Ellipsis seen in (19)-(21) in section 6. The situation 
characterised by the classical conception of anaphora (whereby the anaphor has first to be 
brought into relation with an appropriate co-occurring textual antecedent in order to receive 
its full interpretation) is thus completely reversed —i.e. the indexical within its host 
predication “projects” a potential target referent existing within the preceding (or following, 
anticipated) discourse, contracting a relation with a relevant adjacent discourse unit via an 
appropriate coherence relation, in order to integrate the two units into a higher-level unit of 
discourse.   
 
7. Postscript: Errors and confusions in the analysis of indexical references in L3 
students’ scripts at UTM  
 
To end this presentation, I think it would be useful to mention several recurrent errors in 
analysing instances of deixis and anaphora in texts, committed by L3 students at UTM. 
During my time in the English department, I taught a one-semester core course in English 
linguistics, as well as an option course in discourse analysis, discourse anaphora and deixis at 
this level.  
 
 Errors in recognising instances of deixis and anaphora in texts 
 
- Let’s take as a first illustration this extract from a novel:  
 
“…Immediately below them there was a peach tree in first flower, the buds a deep rose colour. The plot 
of ground marked out by Cecilia for her kitchen garden had been turned over for them by a man on a 
tractor from a nearby village. (…) 
Cecilia turned to him [‘Harold’] a face delicately glowing. ‘Darling, look at that patch the man 
turned over for us. It has dried from the deep brown it was at first. It is a reddish ochre now, the true 
Umbria colour.’ (…)” (Barry Unsworth, After Hannibal, 1996). 
 
Now, a majority of students, when asked to analyse the form, meaning and referential function of that in 
the demonstrative NP that patch the man turned over for us (lines 4-5), wrote that it is “anaphoric” in 
reference (since the intended referent, ‘the plot of ground marked out by Cecilia for her kitchen garden’ 
introduced in lines 1-2, has already been evoked). (Of course, it’s not that by itself that has a reference, 
but the whole expression which it “determines”). But this is to confuse two levels of discourse: the 
narration (in which this referent was first introduced) and the dialogue (cf. Benveniste’s distinction 
between “histoire” and “discours”).  
The first level is where the discourse participants are the narrator as locutionary source and the 
reader as “addressee” or intended recipient, and the second, a direct speech segment, involves Cecilia as 
utterer and Harold as addressee. This latter situation is a deictic frame. Note the vocative, attention-
attracting noun Darling that precedes the indexical predication: the use of this noun signals to the person 
so addressed that he is being cast in the (deictic) role of ‘addressee’ by the speaker.   
There follows an imperative sentence Look at that patch the man turned over for us. In 
communicative terms, this represents an invitation to the addressee to turn his gaze towards the patch of 
land at issue — a patch visible from the room in which the interlocutors are situated. The use of the verb 
look is also a clue that it’s a question of evoking something new, and not of maintaining some item of 
information already established in the prior discourse. In addition, the indexical NP that patch the man 
turned over for us is an expanded, not reduced expression —unlike anaphoric markers in general. The 
reduced restrictive relative clause (which) the man turned over for us serves here precisely to help the 
addressee identify the intended referent, using the context of utterance in order to do so. The distal 
demonstrative determiner that is used in order to establish a joint attention focus on a discourse-new 
(though no doubt hearer-old) object of discourse.  
Those students who classified the reference of the dem. NP here as “anaphoric” were no doubt 
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simply relying on the “objective” situation being evoked via the text as a whole, independently of any 
meta-communicative frame involving the discourse participants. But it is clearly deictic here.  
 
-  Extract from Alison Lurie’s (1965) novel, Nowhere City: “…The house was dark. “Katherine?” he 
[Paul Cattleman] called, and walked through to the kitchen, turning on lights as he went. Katherine's 
kitchen was as clean and tidy as an office, unadorned except for an engagement calendar and a shelf of 
herbs...”  
Now, a number of students analysed the indefinite plural NP lights in the second line of this 
extract as functioning “deictically”—presumably because they considered that it is a direct reference to 
the situation being evoked here, and that it is this which is the criterial factor. But the mode of reference 
of lights here is certainly not “deictic”. Indefinite NPs such as lights may enable the addressee or reader 
to identify their referent without their needing to have recourse to the situation of utterance (which is 
distinct from the situation being evoked via the text). The referent of such an NP type is not different on 
every occasion of use (as it is with the use of demonstrative adverbs, NPs or pronouns). Nor is its referent 
“anaphoric”, as a number of other students stated it is, since this occurrence is the first mention of this 
entity in the extract (hence its indefinite character).  
 
- Katherine’s kitchen (l. 3): This possessive NP isn’t “deictic” either (since the reader doesn’t need to 
have recourse to the utterance context in order to access the intended referent); nor is it “anaphoric” 
(despite the fact that the character ‘Katharine’ has already been mentioned). Again, students seem to 
operate on the assumption that “anaphora” is merely a function of the objective facts of the situation 
being evoked via a text in conjunction with a relevant context, and is not a particular mode of reference 
adopted by the speaker or writer.  
 
- “…Paul went into the bedroom. The blinds were drawn down, and his wife was lying in bed in the 
dark…” (extract from the same passage, a few lines further down).  
       Here, the plural definite NP the blinds (l. 1) may well be characterised as “deictic”, since we are 
viewing the scene through the subjective perspective of the character Paul Cattleman. It is these “blinds” 
(Fr. stores) that the reader “sees” as s/he crosses the rooms of the house in question with him. It is the 
definite and not indefinite status of this NP which allows this interpretation. Cf. Bühler’s notion “Deixis 
am Phantasma”.  The reference of the NP the blinds here is at the same time an instance of “associative 
anaphora”, since the referent is understood as being part of the bedroom which is being focused upon in 
this scene (a ‘bedroom’ normally having ‘blinds’ (or ‘curtains’) in it). 
 
Problems in recognising the referring function  
 
- In a (broadsheet) newspaper article on the launch of a new 3D console by Nintendo, the definite NP “the 
first mainstream device to boast “glasses-free” stereoscopic effects” in the sentence “But Nintendo’s new 
games console —the handheld 3DS — is the first mainstream device to boast “glasses-free” stereoscopic 
effects” was often included by students in the sequence of expressions realising the L3 link in the topic 
chain developing the referent ‘the new 3DS console marketed by the firm Nintendo’. Yet this is clearly 
not a referential occurrence at all — rather it is a predicating use (as complement of the copula “is”). 
This NP should therefore not have been included in the list of anaphoric markers of the L3 link in this 
chain.  
 
Confusion between referents 
 
- Certain expressions, though definite, were indicated as belonging to the topic chain developing the 
referent ‘the new 3D console marketed by Nintendo’. But the expressions in question have distinct 
(though admittedly related) referents. For example “the two devices” in the following sentence: “A new 
“Street Pass” mode allows the console to detect when other 3DS owners are nearby, prompting the two 
devices to automatically swap game items, characters and scores as they pass”. The discourse object 
evoked via the use of this def. plural NP is ‘the set of at least two 3D games consoles’, and not the basic 
product as such. The referent isn’t identical (i.e. there is no “coreference” involved), so this marker 
should not have been included in the set of expressions realising the L3 link in this chain.  
 
Confusion between the functioning of INdefinite (non anaphoric) phrases and definite (potentially 
anaphoric) ones 
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- First, a number of students failed to indicate in their analyses that the NPs used to maintain the high 
saliency of a macro-topic referent (hence belonging naturally to the L3 link in the chain at issue) were 
“definite”. But they couldn’t have fulfilled this function if they were not;  
- Moreover, some of them confused the values “definite” and “indefinite” carried by the NPs involved.  
­  In this regard, a number of indefinite NPs (e.g. “400,000 units” and “4m consoles”—see the text 
fragment given below) were wrongly analysed as belonging to the L3 link in this chain, hence as 
maintaining anaphorically the high saliency of the referent. Here is the context of use of these indefinite 
NPs: “…At last month’s Japanese launch, the device was a sell-out, with 400,000 units shifting in the 
first 24 hours. Nintendo says it expects to sell 4m consoles worldwide before the end of March…”. 
 
Errors in properly characterising a marker fulfilling some reference or other  
 
- On occasion, students characterised the nominal expressions they retained as realising a particular link 
in a topic chain simply as “nouns” (or “substantifs”). In doing this, they did not distinguish between the 
“phrasal” status of an expression (NP, PP etc.) and the lexical (or grammatical) status of the head of that 
phrase. But a lexical element (noun, verb, adj, prep etc.) is not capable of referring independently in some 
context. Only the phrase of which it is the head can do this, in principle. Lying behind this (fundamental) 
distinction is the more general dichotomy between the language system, which exists “hors usage”, and 
the use of that system by some user to carry out certain communicative functions (whether of the 
referring, predicating, modifying or appositional or other kind). This is a quite widespread confusion that 
I have noticed elsewhere in my Linguistics teaching.  
 
Incorrect characterisation of the use of some marker or other as “deictic” in value  
 
Quite regularly, proper nouns (or even indefinite NPs) are characterised as bearing a “deictic”  or 
“anadeictic” value in context. Yet proper nouns are by definition  “referentially autonomous” expressions, 
which don’t depend on the context in which they are used in order for their referent to be identified. The 
same applies (but for different reasons) to indefinite NPs. For a marker to be used “(ana)deictically”, the 
addressee or reader must have recourse to some aspect or other of the context at hand, in order to identify 
the referent intended. However, since proper nouns are “names”, their use assumes in the 
addressee/reader prior knowledge of the entity bearing the name in question — whatever their context of 
use may be. As such, their reference is (in principle) constant, across contexts.  
By contrast, if these proper nouns are repeated in a text, following their initial use, and 
especially if these repetititions are made in reduced form, then the contextual status of these uses may 
change: they turn from being referentially autonomous expressions to non-autonomous (or “semi-
autonomous”) ones —the speaker or writer now assuming that their addressee or reader will have some 
prior knowledge of (or familiarity with) the intended referent. This status will enable these uses to take on 
an anaphoric, reference-maintaining function in context.  
 
(Personal) References by section (recent and forthcoming publications)  
 
 2. Anaphora, deixis and “anadeixis”: nature and description 
 
English demonstratives: discourse deixis and anaphora. A discourse-pragmatic account. In R.A. 
Nilson, N. Aba Appiah Amfo & K. Borthen (eds.), Interpreting Utterances: Pragmatics and its 
Interfaces. Essays in honour of Thorstein Fretheim. Oslo: Novus Press, 147-16, 2007. 
 
Indexicality by degrees: anaphora, deixis and “anadeixis”. Presentation given at the Symposium 
« Quel sens pour la linguistique ? » organised to mark the conferral of the degree of ‘docteur honoris 
causa’ upon Professor Sir John Lyons, UTM: 23-24 April 2009.  
 
Text and discourse as context: Discourse anaphora and the FDG Contextual component. In M.E. 
Keizer & G. Wanders (eds.), WP-FDG-82—The London Papers, pp. 97-115, 2009. Available at the 
website www.functionaldiscoursegrammar.info (Web Papers).  
 
Anaphora: Text-based or discourse-dependent? Functionalist vs. formalist accounts. Functions of 
Language (John Benjamins) 17.2: 207-241, 2010.  
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3. Topic chains 
 
Les “chaînes topicales” : leur rôle dans la gestion et la structuration du discours. Cahiers de 
Grammaire 23 : 19-40, 1998.  
 
Discourse anaphora. Entry in K. Brown (ed.), Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics (2
nd
 edition). 
Oxford: Elsevier, pp. 631-638, 2006.  
 
4. Indexicals and (micro-)discourse coherence 
 
Inter-sentential anaphora and coherence relations in discourse: A perfect match. Language Sciences 
31(5): 572-592, 2009.  
 
Le rôle des anaphores dans la mise en place des relations de cohérence : L’hypothèse de J.R. Hobbs.  
Journal of French Language Studies 19.2: 159-181 (July 2009). 
 
5. Indexicals and (macro-)discourse structuring in texts 
 
How indexicals function in texts: Discourse, text and one neo-Gricean account of indexical reference. 
Journal of Pragmatics 40(6): 997-1018, 2008.  
 
When indexicals target discursively subsidiary information: How foregrounding and backgrounding in 
discourse affect indexical reference. Discours 3 (on-line journal) 2008. (http://discours.revues.org/) 
 
Micro-syntax, macro-syntax, foregrounding and backgrounding in discourse: When indexicals target 
discursively subsidiary information. (Re-worked and developed version of the previous article, 
Belgian Journal of Linguistics 26, 2012).  
 
‘Strict’ anadeixis, discourse deixis and text structuring. Language Sciences 33(5): 753-767, 2011. 
 
6. VP and object ellipsis, null and overt pronouns 
 
Non-standard anaphora, discourse integration, and coherence. Verbum XIX nº 1-2: 5-23, 1997. 
 
Null complements, event structure, predication and anaphora: a Functional Discourse Grammar 
account. In J. L. Mackenzie & M. A. Gómez-González (eds.), Studies in Functional Discourse 
Grammar. Berne: Peter Lang, 21-47, 2005.  
 
Compléments nuls vs. pronoms objets manifestes en anglais en tant qu’anaphoriques : syntaxe, 
sémantique ou pragmatique ? Cahiers de Grammaire 30 : 89-101, 2006. 
 
Implicit internal arguments, event structure, predication and anaphoric reference. Ch. 9 in N. Hedberg 
& R. Zacharski (eds.), The Grammar-Pragmatics Interface. Essays in honor of Jeanette K. Gundel, 
Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 189-216 (Pragmatics and Beyond series), 2007. 
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